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Executive Summary 
1. The Higher Education Bill, narrowly endorsed by MPs in their vote on 27 
January 2004, will abolish upfront tuition fees for students and introduce 
variable fees of up to £3,000 a year from 2006–07. Graduates will be 
entitled to a subsidised Graduate Contribution Scheme (GCS) loan equal 
to the value of their fees. Graduates from 2009 will contribute 9% of any 
earnings above £13,925 each year towards repaying the loan. The 
outstanding value of the loan will rise each year in line with inflation, 
with any sum remaining unpaid after 25 years being written off. 
2. While at college, students from the poorest backgrounds will receive a 
bursary of at least £300 a year if the higher education institution charges 
full top-up fees. Under the most recent proposals, students from families 
with incomes of up to £33,630 will receive a means-tested grant of up to 
£2,700 a year. Students will also be entitled to a means-tested loan of at 
least £3,300 (for those living away from home and outside London), to 
help cover living costs.  
3. These current proposals – which include the concessions introduced in 
January 2004 – differ from those of the White Paper published in January 
2003 principally in the greater generosity of the support provided to 
students while at college, and especially to those from poorer 
backgrounds. Graduates will have to start repaying their loans at lower 
incomes than under the original proposals, but for graduates who remain 
on low incomes for a long time after leaving college, their outstanding 
debts will eventually be written off. 
4. The largest government-sponsored debt that a student with parents on an 
income of up to £26,000 could incur for a three-year course living away 
from home outside London would be £19,335 in 2006–07 prices. The 
potential debt then rises to a maximum of £21,885 for a student whose 
parents’ income is £33,630 a year (and therefore just large enough for the 
student to no longer be entitled to a grant). The potential debt then 
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declines steadily again to £18,665 for students with parents on incomes 
above £44,000.  
5. According to the National Union of Students, a full-time student living 
outside London and away from home would need £9,890 per academic 
year in 2006–07 prices to live and pay tuition fees of £3,000. We 
calculate that for students with parents on incomes of up to £15,970 a 
year, the combination of bursary, grant and loans would leave them 
around £335 a year short of this total. The shortfall then increases as 
parental income rises and as the student’s entitlement to grant diminishes. 
Students from middle-income backgrounds (with parental income of 
around £25,000) could be £2,400 short and those from high-income 
backgrounds (parental income above £44,000) around £3,590 short.  
6. Students receiving parental contributions or income from other sources 
which means that they do not need to take out the maximum loan 
available to them would still be well advised to do so because of the 
government subsidy. They could put the money in an interest-bearing 
bank account and make a profit. 
7. Whatever amount a graduate earns, the loan repayment they will have to 
make is relatively small compared with their income tax and employee 
National Insurance bill. A graduate on £10,000 a year in 2009–10 would 
pay 13.9% of gross income in these taxes and no loan repayment; a 
graduate on £25,000 a year would pay 25.4% in tax and 4.0% in loan 
repayment; and a graduate on £50,000 a year would pay 30.3% in tax and 
6.5% in loan repayment. 
8. Imagine a graduate who completed a three-year course and then earned 
the median graduate income for their age until 55; in other words, if you 
were to line all graduates of the same gender up from rich to poor, they 
would be the ones in the middle in each year. A typical male graduate of 
this sort would have lifetime gross earnings of just over £1.2 million and 
would pay £329,996 in income tax and National Insurance. If the graduate 
had parents with income of £35,000, he would make £21,440 in loan 
repayments over 20 years, adding 6.5% to his tax bill and raising his 
working-lifetime average tax rate from 27.5% to 29.3%. (Of course, he 
would be paying a number of other taxes as well, which we do not 
consider.) He would also in effect have received a subsidy on the loan 
from the taxpayer of £6,103. 
9. The addition to the tax bill on this definition for the equivalent female 
graduate would be 8.0%, which is higher because she could expect to earn 
less over her lifetime (which also means that the female graduate would 
take four years longer to pay off her loans). For both male and female 
graduates, the additional tax bill would be slightly smaller if they had 
come from low- to middle-income families (and had therefore received 
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bigger grants) or from high-income families (and had therefore not been 
entitled to such large maintenance loans). 
10. Would students opting for longer courses find their loans a bigger 
burden? Imagine a female doctor graduating after five years at college 
and – as one might imagine for this sort of job – starting work three-
quarters of the way up the female graduate earnings distribution. She 
would earn more, pay more tax and make bigger loan repayments than the 
typical female graduate. If her parents had income of £35,000, the loan 
repayments would add 7.4% to her tax bill. 
11. What about a female graduate who starts work on relatively low earnings 
of £6,800 in 2006–07 prices – about a quarter of the way up the female 
graduate earnings distribution – and then takes five years out of the labour 
market at age 28 to start a family. She would not earn enough to repay all 
of her loan within 25 years and would therefore have received a much 
larger subsidy from the taxpayer – about two-thirds of the value of her 
debt. Her loan repayments would add around 5.8% to her working-
lifetime income tax and National Insurance bill. 
12. A high-flying male graduate starting work and remaining 95% of the way 
up the male graduate earnings distribution would pay off his debt in 
around 10 years and would therefore receive a smaller public subsidy in 
proportion to his debt than the typical male graduate. Because of the 
progressive nature of the income tax system, he would pay a bigger 
proportion of his income in tax, and his loan repayments would therefore 
add less than 2% to his tax bill. 
13. All of these examples suggest that the repayment burden implied by 
taking out even the maximum student loan would be relatively small 
compared with the income tax and National Insurance that graduates 
would be paying anyway. 
14. In costing its plans, the government currently assumes that 75% of 
courses will attract the full top-up fee of £3,000 per year and that the rest 
will remain at the basic fee level of around £1,200 (in 2006–07, when the 
top-up fees come in). Based on this assumption, top-up fees are likely to 
bring in around an extra £1 billion per year. Universities and colleges will 
be allowed to keep the additional revenue from the top-up fee, but will be 
required to pay back at least £300 per qualifying student in bursaries. This 
could cost them £50 million in total. 
15. The top-up fees will therefore provide universities with up to an extra 
£950 million to spend on increased teaching resources, depending on how 
generous their bursaries are. This could increase teaching resources per 
head by around £1,250, or 22% on top of the current level of £5,600 (in 
2006–07 prices). 
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16. As well as ensuring universities extra revenue, the government is also 
committed to increasing spending on student support. In order to pay for 
the extra grants that students will qualify for from 2004–05 and to 
subsidise the new loans, the government will have to find in excess of  
£1 billion. It has promised that this will not be taken from the higher 
education budget, but the amount will have to come either from other 
public spending categories or from general taxation. 
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1. Introduction 
The government’s plans for reforming higher education (HE) funding have 
been a source of great controversy. Much of this controversy has been focused 
on what the reforms will mean for students from different family income 
backgrounds and on the levels of debt they may need to incur to go to higher 
education. Concern has also been raised about how graduates will be affected 
by these debt repayments throughout their working lives, as well as whether or 
not the funds raised will improve the situation of universities significantly. 
This Briefing Note addresses these issues, as well as describing the evolution 
of the proposed reforms to HE funding in recent months. In doing this, we set 
out and explain the system that is most likely to be implemented if the Higher 
Education Bill passes into law1 and discuss the ways in which students, 
graduates and universities are likely to be affected. We also consider the 
possible effects on the taxpayer. Our Briefing Note builds on earlier work at 
IFS in which we provided a detailed assessment of the proposals originally 
outlined in the government’s White Paper and compared these with proposals 
that were being put forward by the Conservatives.2  
2. An Analysis of the Proposed Reforms 
In analysing the proposed reforms, we answer five key questions, namely: 
(i) What are the proposed reforms? 
(ii) What will the reforms mean for student support in higher education? 
(iii) What will the reforms mean for students once they leave higher 
education? 
(iv) How much extra money can universities expect to see, and how may 
the bursary system affect this? 
(v) What are the costs to the taxpayer of the reforms? 
(i) What are the proposed reforms? 
The main features of the proposed reforms to the HE funding system are set out 
in Table 1. The first column shows the details originally set out in the White  
 
                                                    
1 At the time of writing this report, the first vote on the Bill in the House of Commons had 
been endorsed by a majority of MPs, but the Bill had yet to go through the further stages of 
the parliamentary process. 
2 See Goodman and Kaplan (2003). This report also considered the economic principles 
behind the reforms. 
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Table 1 
Details of the White Paper 2003 and the Higher Education Bill 2004 
(2006–07 prices) 
Measures White Paper 
January 2003 
Higher Education Bill 
8 January 2004 
The ‘new system’: 
proposed changes to 
Higher Education Bill 
19 January 2004 
FEES 
UPFRONT FEES 
 
 
DEFERRED FEES 
 
From 2006–07 
No upfront fee. 
 
From 2006–07 
Set by university. 
Initial cap of £3,000 p.a. 
 
Full exemption on fee up 
to £1,200 p.a. if family 
income <£22,580. 
Partial exemption on fee 
up to £1,200 p.a. if family 
income <£33,630. 
 
From 2006–07 
As in White Paper. 
 
From 2006–07 
As in White Paper. 
 
From 2006–07 
As in White Paper. 
 
From 2006–07 
As in White Paper. 
 
 
Fee exemptions replaced by 
grants. 
LOANS 
 
 
 
LOANS FOR FEES 
 
 
 
 
 
From 2006–07 
Graduate Contribution 
Scheme (GCS). 
Repayment terms same as 
for maintenance loans. 
From 2006–07 
Debt forgiveness after 
25 years. 
 
 
 
 
From 2006–07 
Increased GCS loans (equal 
to the amount of the fee 
exemption) for those who 
would have been eligible for 
fee exemptions, i.e. if family 
income <£33,630. 
 
LOANS FOR 
MAINTENANCE  
Students living away 
from home outside 
London 
 
From 2006–07 
£4,275 (£3,711)a p.a. if 
family income <£33,630. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tapered to 75% of 
maximum value as family 
income rises to £44,000 
(£42,500). 
 
From 2006–07 
£4,405 (£4,075) p.a. if 
family income <£33,630. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As in White Paper. 
 
From 2006–07 
£3,555 (£3,225) p.a. if 
family income <£26,000. 
Represents a reduction of 
£850 on HE Bill proposal. 
 
Loan reduction of £850 is 
tapered away between 
family income of £26,000 
and £33,630 (so that for 
family income of £33,630 
the loan is as in HE Bill). 
 
As in White Paper. 
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LOANS FOR 
MAINTENANCE  
Students living away 
from home inside 
London 
 
From 2006–07 
£5,272 (£4,572) p.a. if 
family income <£33,630. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tapered to 75% of 
maximum value as family 
income rises to £46,200 
(£44,500). 
 
From 2006–07 
£6,170 (£5,620) p.a. if 
family income <£33,630. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As in White Paper. 
From 2006–07 
£5,320 (£4,770) p.a. if 
family income <£26,000. 
Represents a reduction of 
£850 on HE Bill proposal.  
 
Loan reduction of £850 is 
tapered away between 
family income of £26,000 
and £33,630. 
 
As in White Paper. 
REPAYMENT  
OF LOANS 
 
From 2005–06 
9% of income above 
£15,000. £15,000 to be 
uprated with inflation. 
Zero real interest rate. 
From 2005–06 
9% of income above 
£15,375. £15,375 to be 
fixed in nominal terms 
until 2010–11.b 
Zero real interest rate. 
 
No change from HE Bill. 
GRANTS 
MAINTENANCE 
GRANTS 
 
From 2004–05 
£1,050 p.a. if family 
income <£10,510. 
Tapered to zero at family 
income of £21,015. 
 
2004–05 and 2005–06 
£1,050 p.a. if family 
income <£15,970. 
Tapered to zero at family 
income of £22,260. 
 
From 2006–07 
£1,500 p.a. if family 
income <£15,970. 
Tapered to zero at family 
income of £22,260. 
 
 
 
No change from HE Bill. 
 
 
 
 
From 2006–07 
Replaced by a single 
combined HE grant. 
SINGLE COMBINED 
HE GRANT 
 
None. 
 
None. 
From 2006–07 
Means-tested maximum of 
£2,700 p.a., comprised of: 
(a) £1,200 if family income 
<£22,580. 
Tapered to zero at family 
income of £33,630. 
plus 
(b) £1,500 if family income 
<£15,970. 
Tapered to zero at family 
income of £22,260.c 
BURSARIES  
None. 
From 2006–07 
Minimum of £300 p.a. if 
family income <£15,970 
and university charges fees 
of £3,000 p.a.d 
 
No change from HE Bill. 
Notes to table appear on next page. 
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Notes to Table 1: 
a Throughout this table, non-parenthesised figures refer to first- and second-year students and 
parenthesised figures refer to final-year students. 
b The threshold being fixed in nominal terms means that its real value will be eroded over 
time. Its value in 2009–10, based on an expected inflation rate of 2.5% per annum, is £13,925 
in 2006–07 prices. 
c These represent our best interpretation of the reforms published for discussion on 19 January 
2004. The exact details of the combined grant and maintenance loan thresholds and tapers are 
yet to be determined, but some indicative figures were provided in Department for Education 
and Skills (2004c).  
d Any university with fees of over £2,700 will have to provide such bursaries to cover the 
extra fee above that level for students from the poorest backgrounds. 
Note: All figures have been converted to 2006–07 prices using an inflation rate of 2.5% per 
year.  
Sources: Department for Education and Skills, 2003, 2004a, 2004b and 2004c. 
 
Paper on HE reform in January 2003, and the other two columns show the 
subsequent changes, or ‘concessions’, that have been made.  
MPs voted on 27 January 2004 on the Higher Education Bill that was presented 
to Parliament on 8 January 2004 (middle column of Table 1), but the further 
modifications, published for discussion on 19 January 2004, probably resemble 
most closely any system that would actually be introduced were the Higher 
Education Bill to be passed through the rest of the parliamentary process. In 
what follows, we refer to this as the ‘new system’ (final column of Table 1). 
The new system will see the abolition of upfront tuition fees for students and 
the introduction of variable fees of up to £3,000 a year from 2006–07. 
Graduates will be entitled to a subsidised Graduate Contribution Scheme 
(GCS) loan equal to the value of their fees. Graduates from 2009 will 
contribute 9% of any earnings above £13,925 each year towards repaying the 
loan. The outstanding value of the loan will rise each year in line with inflation, 
with any sum remaining unpaid after 25 years being written off. 
While at college, students from the poorest backgrounds will receive a bursary 
of at least £300 a year if the higher education institution charges full top-up 
fees.3 Students from families with incomes of up to £33,630 will receive a 
means-tested grant of up to £2,700 a year. Students will also be entitled to a 
means-tested loan of at least £3,300 (for those living away from home and 
outside London), to help cover living costs.  
The current proposals – after the concessions introduced in January 2004 – 
differ from those of the White Paper published in January 2003 principally in 
the greater generosity of the support provided to students while at college, and 
especially to those from poorer backgrounds. Most of the additional support 
                                                    
3 In fact, any university with fees of over £2,700 will have to provide bursaries to cover the 
extra fee above that level for students from the poorest backgrounds. 
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provided for in the HE Bill is designed to give the poorest students the option 
to avoid incurring debt for any fees that universities may choose to charge. This 
increased generosity was brought about by increasing the level of the 
maintenance grant4 and by increasing the maintenance loan allowances for all 
students, though particularly for students in their final year and for students in 
London. The HE Bill also introduced proposals for mandatory bursaries to be 
paid to students by universities.  
Graduates will have to start repaying their loans at lower incomes than under 
the original White Paper proposals, but for graduates who remain on low 
incomes for a long time after leaving college, their outstanding debts will 
eventually be written off. 
The further reforms published for discussion on 19 January 2004 would 
convert what is currently a fee remission (for the basic fee) for students from 
the lowest income backgrounds into a grant, and would modify the borrowing 
entitlement of students accordingly, to ensure that there are no extra costs to the 
exchequer. 
Before proceeding, it should be noted that throughout this Briefing Note, we 
present all figures relating to the reforms in 2006–07 prices, not current 2003–
04 prices.5 The corresponding figures in today’s prices are available from the 
authors. 
(ii) What will the reforms mean for student support in higher education? 
Our assessment of student support in higher education focuses mainly on the 
system described in the final column of Table 1. Although the exact details of 
this system are still the subject of government consultation and have not yet 
been fully established,6 we believe it to be the most likely system to be 
implemented if the Bill is passed through the rest of the parliamentary process. 
As with Table 1 above, we express all monetary amounts in 2006–07 prices, 
and we consider how the system will impact on students who enter higher 
education from 2006–07. 
The proposed system is fairly complex, and in order to examine how it will 
affect students’ finances whilst they are in higher education, we illustrate it 
graphically, showing the different effects for students across the parental 
income spectrum. For illustrative purposes, we assume that the student lives 
away from home and is in either the first or second year of higher education.7 
                                                    
4 The level of parental income at which students are entitled to receive the grant was also 
made more generous. 
5 This follows the government’s own approach in its presentation of the key features of the 
reforms. 
6 In particular, we think that the exact details of the tapering of the grants and loans in the 
income range between around £22,000 and £33,000 are likely to be modified. 
7 It should be noted that final-year students are entitled to a lower maintenance loan. 
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We also show how the proposed support package compares with NUS 
estimates of the cost of living for students, giving us one estimate of the 
expected ‘shortfall’ in support. This is the amount the student must obtain from 
non-government sources.8 There are also some differences in the generosity of 
maintenance loans for those living in London. We illustrate the effects on 
London students in Appendix A, Figure A1. We also show the effects of the 
system published in the Higher Education Bill (i.e. without the new single 
combined HE grant) in Appendix A, Figures A2 and A3. 
How much debt will a student incur? 
Figure 1 shows that the maximum level of government-sponsored debt (i.e. 
loans for fees and maintenance loans combined) that a student will be able to 
take out each year is £6,555 for a young person with parental income less than 
£26,000 and reaches its maximum level of £7,405 for those with a family 
income of £33,630. Because the maximum level of the maintenance loan is 
tapered away for those from higher-income backgrounds, students whose 
parental income is above £44,000 will be able to borrow a smaller amount than 
those from low- and middle-income families (£6,300). A quirk of the new 
system that has not yet received much attention is that students whose parental 
income is £33,630 will be able to borrow the most. This is because those on 
lower family incomes, who will be given more money upfront in the form of 
grants, are likely to have their maintenance loans somewhat restricted to keep 
government costs down.9 
Taking into account the amount that students will be able to borrow in their 
final year, these annual debt figures imply that a student on a three-year course 
with fees set at the maximum £3,000 cap could graduate with government-
sponsored debt of £19,335 if they are from lower- or middle-income 
backgrounds (as we have defined middle income here10) and £18,665 if they 
are from the highest-income backgrounds. These levels are shown in Table 2, 
together with the maximum levels of debt students may incur at present and 
over the period of transition up to 2006–07.  
The highest permitted level of debt at graduation for a three-year course outside 
London would be £21,885 (not shown on Table 2). This is for a student whose 
parents’ income is £33,630 per year. From Table 2, we see that a student from a 
family earning £35,000 per year could have a debt up to £21,440 for a three-
year course outside London. 
                                                    
8 For example, it may come from parental support, student savings or part-time earnings. 
9 For further explanation, see Department for Education and Skills (2004b). 
10 Our middle-income family is assumed to be on £25,500 per annum. This leaves the student 
with a maximum maintenance loan of £3,555 per year. 
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Figure 1 
Non-London student finances under the new system with fees of £3,000 p.a. 
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Notes: Bursaries are zero at incomes of £15,970 and over, with no tapering. We assume the 
student is in the first or second year of a three-year course. 
 
Table 2 
Maximum level of debt upon graduation for a three-year course attracting the 
maximum top-up fee, by year of higher education entry 
Year of higher education entry: TOTAL LOANS: 
FEES plus MAINTENANCE 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07
Low income (up to £15,970 p.a.) £12,355 £13,045 £13,490 £19,335 
Middle income (around £25,500 p.a.) £12,355 £13,470 £13,490 £19,335 
Upper middle income (around £35,000 p.a.) £11,925 £13,450 £14,740 £21,440 
High income (above £44,000 p.a.) £9,265 £10,720 £11,995 £18,665 
Notes: This table applies to students living away from home outside London on a three-year 
course that charges the maximum top-up fee. All monetary amounts are expressed in 2006–07 
prices. The figures are calculated on the basis of the following likely features of the new 
system: 
Variable fees apply only to new students in 2006–07. 
Fee deferral is allowed for all students from 2006–07. 
Maintenance grant component of the single combined HE grant increases from a maximum of 
£1,000 to £1,500 for new students only from 2006–07. 
Fee grant component of the single combined HE grant (maximum £1,200) applies to all 
students from 2006–07. 
 
How much will be available through grants? 
Figure 1 also shows the level of upfront support (i.e. that students will not have 
to repay) under the new system. Including the minimum mandatory bursary for 
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those who attend a higher education institution that charges the maximum fee 
of £3,000,11 those from the lowest-income backgrounds can expect to receive 
£3,000 per year from the single combined grant. The implication of this is that 
these students need not take out any debt for fees, if they use the whole 
combined grant plus bursary to pay for these. However, as we will show in the 
next subsection, it is unlikely that students without generous parents, or without 
other sources of income, or without a higher bursary, will be able to cover all 
of their living costs without putting at least some of their grant towards these. It 
is also important to realise that even if they could afford to spend their entire 
grant on fees, these students would be well advised to take out the maximum 
level of debt available to them, and to save any money they could have put 
towards fee repayment in an interest-bearing bank account. This is because of 
the large government subsidies involved in the loan repayment terms. 
The single combined HE grant will then be tapered away in a non-linear 
fashion12 between income levels of £15,970 and £33,630. No one whose family 
income lies above £33,630 will be eligible for any grant. 
Will all this be enough to live on? 
Finally, Figure 1 allows us to assess whether the total amount of loans and 
grants payable to students will be enough to live on, or whether they will still 
need to find external sources of funding to meet their daily living needs. 
According to the National Union of Students (2003), a full-time student living 
outside London away from home needs £9,890 per academic year to live, 
inclusive of tuition fees of £3,000.13 On the basis of our calculations, the 
support available to students from the lowest-income families should come 
close to providing the income required, so long as the student takes out the full 
loan available to them (in this case, funds available from the state will leave 
them around £335 per year short of what they need, assuming the minimum 
bursary from the higher education institution14). However, where poor students 
are very debt averse, and as such do not want to take out any debt for fees, the 
system will leave them £3,335 per year short of what they need.  
                                                    
11 The exact means-testing surrounding the bursaries is not yet clear. We have assumed that 
the minimum levels that are required by the government will be in line with the means tests 
applied to individuals on the maximum level of grants. It may be the case that some 
universities choose to pay higher bursaries or to means-test in a more generous way than this. 
12 This non-linearity arises from the fact that the new single combined HE grant is comprised 
of two separate elements of the previously proposed White Paper and HE Bill systems – 
namely, the maintenance grant and the fee exemptions. These were tapered at different rates 
and on different income thresholds. It is likely that the detail of this tapering will be worked 
on and altered before implementation. 
13 Source: NUS Press Pack 2003–2004. We have converted the estimated living costs in 
2003–04 into 2006–07 prices, and have added the full top-up fee for our example. 
14 Indeed, as is illustrated in Appendix A, Figure A1, in London, students from the poorest 
backgrounds will receive around £200 more than current NUS estimates of the cost of living 
in London from state support and bursaries if they borrow up to the maximum amount. 
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The level of the estimated shortfall in money to pay for living expenses 
increases sharply with parental income above £15,970. Depending on the exact 
operation of the various tapers, students from middle-income backgrounds (i.e. 
with incomes in the region of £25,000) could be up to £2,400 short each year if 
they take out all of the loans available to them. At the very highest income 
levels, the shortfall that would need to be met from external sources of funding 
(e.g. parental contributions) is around £3,590 a year. 
(iii) What will the reforms mean for students once they leave higher 
education? 
The impact of these reforms on the longer-term outcomes for students once 
they leave higher education will crucially depend on their lifetime labour 
market earnings and employment patterns. There is convincing evidence that in 
the UK, HE graduates have significant private returns to undertaking this 
additional education compared with similar non-graduates.15 Despite these 
significant private returns, however, critics of the scheme are still concerned 
that the level of debt students may incur during their studies will create a 
significant burden on them throughout their working life and that fear of this 
may affect their HE choices. Before looking at individual examples, it is 
interesting to look at what repayments students will face at different earnings 
levels. One key feature of the scheme is that regardless of the level of 
government-sponsored debt, the amount of graduate repayments will be 
identical for all graduates earning the same income after graduation. By 2009–
10, all graduates with such debt will pay 9% of their gross income above 
£13,925 (in 2006–07 prices).16 The only way the level of debt affects graduates 
differentially is through the number of years they continue repaying their loan. 
All loans are written off after 25 years. 
What we see from Table 3 is that the GCS payment increases average tax rates 
at all gross salaries above £13,925, but that these levels are very modest at most 
income levels. A graduate earning £25,000 per year (in 2006–07 prices) will 
have his or her average tax rate increased from 25.4% to 29.4% and will pay an 
extra £19.17 a week in tax. So, instead of taking home £358.87 per week, they 
will take home £339.70, a decrease in net pay of 5.3%. 
                                                    
15 Recent work undertaken at IFS suggests that an otherwise identical woman receives, on 
average, somewhere between 25% and 27% higher earnings as a result of undertaking higher 
education. The corresponding return for men is somewhere between 18% and 21%. 
16 We are assuming a rate of inflation of 2.5%. The amount in 2005–06 will be £15,000 
(which is £15,375 in 2006–07 prices), but because this threshold is not going to be uprated 
with inflation until 2010–11, it will steadily decrease in real value between 2006–07 and 
2009–10, but thereafter remain at £13,925 in 2006–07 prices. In all of the estimates presented 
below, we use the £13,925 figure as this will be the figure applying to students entering the 
HE system from 2006–07 when the new system comes into play. 
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Table 3 
What graduates pay at different earnings levels 
Gross income Income tax plus employee 
National Insurance payments 
(% of gross income) 
GCS payments 
(% of gross income) 
Annual Weekly Annual Weekly Annual Weekly 
£10,000 £192.31 £1,389 £26.72 £0 £0 
  (13.9%) (0.0%) 
£15,000 £288.46 £3,039 £58.44 £97 £1.87 
  (20.3%) (0.6%) 
£20,000 £384.62 £4,689 £90.17 £547 £10.52 
  (23.4%) (2.7%) 
£25,000 £480.77 £6,339 £121.90 £997 £19.17 
  (25.4%) (4.0%) 
£30,000 £576.92 £7,989 £153.63 £1,447 £27.83 
  (26.6%) (4.8%) 
£35,000 £673.08 £9,519 £183.06 £1,897 £36.48 
  (27.2%) (5.4%) 
£40,000 £769.23 £11,033 £212.17 £2,347 £45.13 
  (27.6%) (5.9%) 
£50,000 £961.54 £15,133 £291.02 £3,247 £62.44 
  (30.3%) (6.5%) 
Notes: 
1. All figures are in 2006–07 prices. 
2. These figures apply to all graduates who complete their studies in 2009–10 or afterwards. 
3. The income tax and National Insurance calculations take no account of any in-work 
benefits that might apply and use 2003–04 tax rates and thresholds uprated to 2006–07 
prices. 
 
Having established what the GCS means for students earning different 
incomes, we now move on to a few illustrative examples to see what the new 
package of reforms means for different types of students from different 
backgrounds and to see just how much the GCS will ‘burden’ students. We also 
compare lifetime GCS payments with the expected income tax and National 
Insurance contributions that graduates are likely to make throughout their 
working life. 
In what follows, we choose a number of different career paths and see how this 
affects students from different backgrounds. The purpose of these examples is 
merely illustrative, but they give some insight into the longer-term impact of 
the GCS and its effect on graduates’ net earnings over their working life. 
Earnings profiles of median graduates and non-graduates 
In our first example below, we look at the situation for male and female 
graduates who remain in employment throughout their life and earn median 
graduate earnings. In 2006–07, we estimate that the median starting salary will 
be around £12,100 for a 21-year-old male HE graduate and around £11,700 for 
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a 21-year-old female HE graduate.17 We have used the panel element of the 
Labour Force Survey to estimate wage-growth profiles for both men and 
women at different points in the income distribution.18 We have also carried 
out a similar exercise for non-graduates. In Figures 2 and 3, we show our 
estimated wage-earning profiles for median male and female graduates and 
non-graduates. Some caution must be exercised in comparing the profiles of a 
non-graduate on median earnings and a graduate on median earnings. The path 
for the median non-graduate is unlikely to reflect the path that the median 
graduate would have taken had he or she not pursued HE. If, for example, 
graduates on average have higher ability than non-graduates, we may expect 
the median graduate to have started further up the non-graduate earnings 
distribution because of this higher ability. 
Figures 2 and 3 are for illustrative purposes only. One point that they illustrate 
is that an important part of the cost of undertaking HE is the forgone wages a 
graduate could have received if he or she had not undertaken his or her course. 
This clearly needs to be taken into account when an individual is deciding 
whether or not to undertake HE. In addition, although the lifetime earnings of 
graduates are generally higher than those of non-graduates, non-graduates may 
still earn more than graduates when young because of their greater labour 
market experience.  
In the rest of this Briefing Note, we focus on the earnings profiles of graduates 
only. In particular, we ask the question, ‘What do these earnings profiles mean 
for graduates and for the repayment of their debts?’. To look at this, we 
compare the implications for students coming from low-, middle-, upper-
middle- and high-income families, as outlined in Table 2. Under the system 
likely to be in place for students from 2006–07, the debt faced by students 
coming from low- and middle-income families will be the same, so we 
consider these individuals jointly. As with Table 2, we also look at the example 
of an individual coming from a family earning £35,000, as it is students coming 
from these medium- to high-income families who will face the greatest debt.  
It should be remembered that what follow are only illustrative examples. In all 
of the examples, we assume that students borrow the maximum amount 
available to them. We compare their GCS debt repayments with their income 
tax and National Insurance contributions over their working lifetime.19 We also 
calculate how long it will take them to pay off their student debt, the 
contribution of the taxpayer to their loan and the increased tax payments 
brought about by the GCS. 
                                                    
17 This is based on the latest Labour Force Survey estimates uprated to 2006–07 prices. 
18 Full details of this are available from the authors. 
19 These calculations ignore any tax credits or benefits the graduate may receive, to keep the 
examples simple. We also do not take into account any income tax payments after retirement. 
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Figure 2 
Wage-earning profiles for median male graduate and non-graduate (2006–07 prices) 
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Figure 3 
Wage-earning profiles for median female graduate and non-graduate (2006–07 prices) 
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Example 1: graduates who earn median earnings throughout their life 
Our first example looks at graduates who follow the gross earnings path of the 
median male and female graduate as estimated in Figures 2 and 3. As we stated 
above, for this exercise we assume that the male graduate starts on a salary of 
£12,100 at age 21 and the female graduate starts on a salary of £11,700 at the 
same age. We assume that they have no breaks from the labour market and 
consider earnings between the ages of 21 and 55. We look at the implication of 
the proposed system of HE funding for students coming from families earning 
less than £26,000 per annum, families earning £35,000 per annum and families 
earning above £44,000 per annum. The results of this exercise are shown in 
Table 4. 
Table 4 
Long-term impact of GCS for median male and female graduate earners 
 Student from family 
earning <£26,000 
Student from family 
earning £35,000 
Student from family 
earning >£44,000 
Male undertaking three-year course    
Debt £19,335 £21,440 £18,665 
Taxpayer subsidy on debt £5,301 (27.4%) £6,103 (28.5%) £5,050 (27.1%) 
Years to pay debt 19 20 19 
Amount of debt not paid £0 £0 £0 
Lifetime gross earnings £1,201,004 £1,201,004 £1,201,004 
Working-lifetime income tax and NI £329,996 £329,996 £329,996 
Percentage increase in tax payments 5.9% 6.5% 5.7% 
    
Female undertaking three-year course    
Debt £19,335 £21,440 £18,665 
Taxpayer subsidy on debt £5,910 (30.6%) £6,842 (31.9%) £5,620 (30.1%) 
Years to pay debt 23 24 23 
Amount of debt not paid £0 £0 £0 
Lifetime gross earnings £1,016,838 £1,016,838 £1,016,838 
Working-lifetime income tax and NI £267,640 £267,640 £267,640 
Percentage increase in tax payments 7.2% 8.0% 7.0% 
Notes: 
1. All figures are in 2006–07 prices and apply to individuals who graduate from 2009–10. 
2. We assume that 2003–04 income tax and National Insurance (NI) rates and thresholds are 
in force and uprate them to 2006–07 prices. 
3. We assume a government borrowing rate of 2.5% to calculate the taxpayer subsidy of the 
deferred loan. We also include any unpaid debt after the 25-year remission. 
4. The level of maximum debt shown in the table is for a student living away from home 
who takes a course outside London. 
 
The first interesting point to note is that the overall student debt in all three 
example families is much smaller than the expected income tax and National 
Insurance payments that a graduate on median earnings will pay over their 
working lifetime. For male students from families earning less than £26,000, 
overall working-lifetime tax payments are increased by 5.9%, whereas for 
those from families earning £35,000, tax payments are increased by 6.5%; 
graduates from high-income families have their payments increased by 5.7%. 
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The percentage increases in tax payments for females are higher than those for 
males, due to the fact that they are expected to earn less during their lifetime.  
What also varies between male and female graduates is the number of years it 
will take them to pay off their student loan. Female graduates, on average, will 
take an extra four years in this example because of their expected lower 
earnings.  
An additional calculation we have made (not shown in our tables) is the 
difference in income tax and National Insurance payments over their working 
lifetimes of a ‘typical’ graduate and a ‘typical’ non-graduate. The difference is 
approximately £154,000 for median male earners and approximately £152,000 
for median female earners.20 This increase in direct tax associated with 
becoming a graduate is large compared with the additional deferred fees 
graduates are being asked to pay. 
Example 2: female graduate doctor undertaking a five-year course 
One important concern raised by some critics is the level of debt faced by 
students who undertake courses that are longer than three years. In this 
example, we consider a female doctor who graduates and starts on a salary of 
£21,000 at age 23.21 This would place her at about the 75th percentile of the 
female earnings distribution at this age, and in the example below, we assume 
that she stays at around this percentile throughout her working life (again until 
the age of 55). The likely effect on such a graduate from different family types 
is shown in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Long-term impact of GCS for female doctor taking out maximum loan 
 Student from family 
earning <£26,000 
Student from family 
earning £35,000 
Student from family 
earning >£44,000 
Female undertaking five-year course    
Debt £32,445 £35,956 £31,271 
Taxpayer subsidy on debt £7,568 (23.3%) £8,852 (24.6%) £7,149 (22.9%) 
Years to pay debt 18 19 17 
Amount of debt not paid £0 £0 £0 
Lifetime gross earnings £1,593,855 £1,593,855 £1,593,855 
Working-lifetime income tax and NI £487,250 £487,250 £487,250 
Percentage increase in tax payments 6.7% 7.4% 6.4% 
Notes: See notes to Table 4. 
 
What is clear from this example is that the level of debt incurred by students 
undertaking five-year courses is significantly greater than the level incurred by 
those undertaking shorter courses. Individuals from families earning £35,000 
                                                    
20 Full details of these calculations can be obtained from the authors. 
21 This figure is approximately the current bottom rate of a House Officer, uprated to April 
2006–07 prices.  
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would face an approximate debt of just under £36,000 if they took out all of 
their loan entitlements. Typically, however, students undertaking such courses 
have much better wage prospects than median earners, and this means that in 
the example in Table 5, the doctor would experience a smaller increase in 
relative tax payments than the woman in the previous example (Table 4). She 
would also pay off her debt about five years earlier, despite the much larger 
loan.  
Example 3: female low earner who takes a five-year career break 
In all the examples considered so far, we have assumed that graduates remain 
in the labour market from graduation until the age of 55. Of course, we know 
that not all graduates are in uninterrupted employment, and this will have an 
impact on the estimated effect of the GCS. In this example, we look at a female 
graduate who starts on a salary of around £6,800 at age 21 but who takes five 
years out of the labour market at the age of 28 to start a family, before 
returning to the labour market. We assume that she returns at the same real 
wage as when she left. Her starting salary places her at about the 25th percentile 
of the female graduate earnings distribution (in 2006–07 prices), and the wage 
profile we have used assumes that she experiences similar wage growth to 
female graduates at that point in the earnings distribution except in the years 
when she is out of the labour market. The results are shown in Table 6.  
Table 6 
Long-term impact of GCS for low-earning female who has a career break 
 Student from family 
earning <£26,000 
Student from family 
earning £35,000 
Student from family 
earning >£44,000 
Female undertaking three-year course    
Debt £19,335 £21,440 £18,665 
Taxpayer subsidy on debt £12,184 (63.0%) £14,289 (66.6%) £11,514 (61.7%) 
Years to pay debt 25 25 25 
Amount of debt not paid £7,349 £9,453 £6,678 
Lifetime gross earnings £806,715 £806,715 £806,715 
Working-lifetime income tax and NI £207,012 £207,012 £207,012 
Percentage increase in tax payments 5.8% 5.8% 5.8% 
Notes: See notes to Table 4. 
 
In this example, both because of her relatively modest lifetime earnings and 
because of her career break, the woman does not fully pay off her student debt. 
This means that around 60–65% of her debt will be subsidised by the taxpayer. 
Also, the proportion of extra tax payments that she makes is unrelated to the 
size of her loan as she does not manage to pay it off fully before the 25-year 
remission comes into play. The increase in her working-lifetime tax payments 
is the lowest of the three female examples we have looked at so far.  
Those who do the best in the labour market receive the smallest government 
subsidy. This should be reassuring to graduates who are worried about what 
happens if they do not do well in the labour market and have modest earnings 
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and/or long periods out of the labour market. This point is reiterated in our next 
example. 
Example 4: male high-flyer 
Our final example is a male graduate with a starting salary of £20,000 at age 
21. This places him in the 95th percentile of the male graduate earnings 
distribution, and his expected wage profile has been estimated assuming that he 
stays at this percentile throughout his working life. The results for this 
individual are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7 
Long-term impact of GCS for male high-flyer 
 Student from family 
earning <£26,000 
Student from family 
earning £35,000 
Student from family 
earning >£44,000 
Male undertaking three-year course    
Debt £19,335 £21,440 £18,665 
Taxpayer subsidy on debt £2,781 (14.4%) £3,242 (15.1%) £2,635 (14.1%) 
Years to pay debt 10 10 9 
Amount of debt not paid £0 £0 £0 
Lifetime gross earnings £3,317,835 £3,317,835 £3,317,835 
Working-lifetime income tax and NI £1,178,032 £1,178,032 £1,178,032 
Percentage increase in tax payments 1.6% 1.8% 1.6% 
Notes: See notes to Table 4. 
 
The first point to note is that this type of graduate pays off his debt in a much 
shorter time than the graduates in the other examples we have considered. 
Because he pays off his student debt so quickly, he receives a much smaller 
subsidy from the taxpayer (of around 14–15%). Because of the progressive 
nature of the direct tax system, he pays a much larger proportion and amount of 
income tax and National Insurance than those in the other examples, which 
means that the increase in his overall tax payments is very modest. 
(iv) How much extra money can universities expect to see, and how may 
the bursary system affect this?  
There has been some controversy over how much additional money universities 
will see from the proposed changes. Table 8 sets out the government’s 
projections of the amount of additional income for universities that could be 
raised from the new top-up fees in 2006–07, and our own calculations of the 
total revenue from fee income that this would imply (including the income 
from the basic fee already in place).22  
                                                    
22 All of these projections are based on a fee-paying student population of 750,000 and 
therefore do not include any revenue that would come from expanding the number of students 
to meet the 50% initial entry rate target set by the government. 
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Table 8 
Projections of approximate income from fees 
 Additional income 
from top-up feea 
Total fee income implied 
(including basic fee)b 
If all courses charge a higher fee of :   
£1,500 £280m £1,180m 
£2,000 £660m £1,560m 
£2,500 £1,035m £1,935m 
£3,000 £1,410m £2,310m 
   
Current central fee scenario: 
75% of universities charge £3,000 
25% of universities charge £1,200 
  
Government projectionsc £990m–£1,010m £1,890m–£1,910m 
a Source: Alan Johnson, Minister for Higher Education, in an answer to a parliamentary 
question from Paul Farrelly on 12 November 2003. See Hansard Written Answers (2003). 
These figures are in addition to fee income to universities from the basic fee (£1,125), not 
including full-time postgraduates (apart from PGCE students).  
We believe that these projections based on the PQ answer are slight overestimates of the 
revenue to the government because they do not take into account the fact that the basic fee 
will be £1,200 in 2006–07 prices, not £1,125 as it is today. 
b These are our own calculations, assuming that the number of students assessed for fees will 
be around 750,000 and that basic fees are £1,200 per annum in 2006–07 prices. 
c Source: Department for Education and Skills – see Appendix B.  
Note: All costings are in 2006–07 prices. 
 
The government’s central scenario at present is that 75% of courses will attract 
the full top-up fee of £3,000 per year and 25% will remain at the basic fee 
level.23 In this central scenario, the government projects that approximately  
£1 billion will be raised in revenue from top-up fees. Together with  
£900 million (in 2006–07 prices) that we project will come in from the basic 
fee, total higher education fee revenue will then be around £1.9 billion per year. 
Will universities keep all of the new money? 
The government has made it clear that the universities will be able to keep all 
of the additional fee revenue coming in from the top-up fees,24 and the Prime 
Minister has guaranteed that the level of state support per student will not be 
reduced as the new contributions from students come in.25 However, it should 
be pointed out that given the generous system of loans that will come hand-in-
                                                    
23 The basic fee is currently set at £1,125, but will be around £1,200 in 2006–07 due to 
inflation uprating. 
24 See chapter 7, paragraph 7.43, page 87 of Department for Education and Skills (2003): 
‘Students paying larger contributions will expect to see the income generated going into 
improved teaching and facilities. Universities will only be able to do this if they have 
available to them the extra cash from the contributions they set. The Government will, 
therefore, provide income to universities equal to the contribution levels they have set. The 
Government will then receive the payment back from students over time’. 
25 See Prime Minister’s press conference, 15 January 2004: www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/Page5181.asp. 
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hand with the new system of fees, up to half of the fee revenue projection is 
likely, in fact, to be paid by taxpayers and not by students or graduates 
themselves.26 
What difference will bursaries make? 
Although universities have been told that they will be able to keep all of the 
new fee revenue, those charging more than £2,700 per year will also be 
required to pay a minimum bursary, up to £300 per student per year for 
students from the poorest backgrounds.27 These mandatory bursaries imply that 
universities will not be able to spend all of the new fee revenue on improving 
teaching standards. 
We calculate that, in total, around £50 million could go towards fulfilling the 
minimum bursary requirements of universities.28 Across all universities, this 
implies that the total new top-up fee revenue that could go towards teaching 
would be reduced by around £50 million, leaving a total of around £950 million 
to spend on increased teaching resources per head. Of course, if universities 
choose to pay more than the minimum bursary, or if they have a high 
proportion of courses charging more than £2,700 in fees, or if the intake from 
lower-income backgrounds increases, then the costs to universities will be 
higher. Universities charging full top-up fees, and that take the most students 
from the poorest backgrounds, will have to pay the most in bursaries. 
What will happen to the amount of funding per head? 
On the government’s central scenario for fees, and taking into account 
minimum bursaries only, we estimate that the average increase in funding per 
head, spread across all students, would be around £1,250. This represents an 
average increase of 22% in the level of funding per head on top of the £5,600 
average.29 If the level of bursaries turns out to be much higher, the average 
increase in spending per head on teaching will be lower.30  
Will the new level of funding reverse the decline in funding per student? 
If funding per student increases by an average of £1,250 per student, this will 
return the unit-funding levels to around those observed in 1992–93, but will 
leave the levels well below the unit funding of the late 1980s. 
                                                    
26 See Dearden and Goodman (2003a and 2003b).  
27 Universities may choose to offer more than the minimum bursary, and some have already 
made it clear that they intend to offer substantial amounts.  
28 This projection is based on the assumption that a £300 bursary is paid to around 168,750 
students (i.e. the poorest 30% of students on the 75% of courses that will charge the full top-
up fee).  
29 This is £5,000 in 2001–02 prices, uprated by inflation to 2006–07 prices. 
30 The government has published an estimate that funding per student could rise on average 
by 30%. This is based on a scenario in which all universities charge the maximum fee of 
£3,000. See Department for Education and Skills (2004b). 
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(v) What are the costs to the taxpayer of the reforms?  
Although much attention has been paid to the additional amount that graduates 
will repay under the new system, relatively less has been said about what the 
full set of reforms included in the original White Paper, and the subsequent 
changes, might imply for public expenditure, and therefore how much 
taxpayers will be expected to contribute. The new loans and grants – which are 
a major component of the reforms – all imply additional public spending. Table 
9 shows the government’s projections of the costs of the new loans and grants 
that will be introduced. 
Table 9 
Government projections of extra taxpayer costs of new fee deferral and student support 
Cost of fee deferral  
Highest estimate of cost of new loans to cover £1,800 variable fee £445m 
Highest estimate of cost of new loans to cover £1,200 basic fee £190m 
Cost of loan write-off after 25 years £30m 
Total cost of fee deferral £665m 
  
Cost of student support  
Increasing loan to median basic living costs £65m 
Cost of new maintenance grant introduced in 2004–05, and 
additional £500 grant from 2006–07 announced in HE Bill 
£420m 
Total cost of student support £485m 
  
Total cost of new grants and loans £1,150m 
Note: All costings are in 2006–07 prices. 
Source: Department for Education and Skills cost projections; see Table B1 in Appendix B. 
 
The table shows that the extra public spending associated with introducing 
deferred top-up fees is forecast by the government to be approximately  
£445 million. This means that for every additional £1 in top-up fee revenue that 
the universities will be able to spend on teaching, the taxpayer will fund 
approximately 50p. Because new loans are also being introduced for the basic 
fee, and, in addition, new provisions have been made for writing off any 
outstanding debts after 25 years, the total cost to government of fee deferral is 
likely to be around £665 million. 
In addition to this, the new grants will also require additional funding. The 
latest government estimate of the costs of the grant system, including the 
maintenance grant of £1,00031 to be introduced in 2004–05 and the subsequent 
increases to be introduced in 2006–07, is £485 million.32  
                                                    
31 This is £1,050 in 2006–07 prices. 
32 The reforms in the 19 January discussion paper were designed to be cost-neutral, and so the 
total public spending implications of the reforms will be the same as those set out in Table 9, 
although the exact composition of the additional costs will change somewhat. 
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In total, therefore, the extra taxpayer costs associated with the full set of 
reforms will be approximately £1.15 billion, according to the latest government 
estimates.33  
3. Conclusions 
Our Briefing Note has highlighted how the original reforms to higher education 
funding published in the DfES White Paper last year have evolved in the wake 
of public consultation and the huge political storm the original reforms 
provoked. Our note has shown the complexity of some of the elements of the 
reforms, along with some of the quirks that have worked their way into the 
proposed system as piecemeal changes have been made.  
We have shown that the maximum level of government-sponsored debt for 
both fees and living expenses that students could graduate with following a 
three-year course is likely to be around £19,335 for those with parental income 
up to £26,000,34 rising to £21,885 for those whose family income is £33,630. 
Students from the highest-income families will be entitled to take out around 
£18,665 in loans. This is a considerable increase on the debt levels that students 
currently face, although it should be remembered that the terms of the loan 
repayments are also being made considerably more generous. 
Although the new reforms introduced into the Higher Education Bill on 8 
January 2004 were designed to make sure that no young person from a low-
income background should have to borrow in order to pay for their fees, we 
have shown that if they do use all of their upfront grant to pay off the £3,000 
fee, and therefore do not take out a fee loan, they will be left with a 
considerable shortfall in the amount that they need to pay for their daily living 
expenses, and so may be forced to borrow in any case. On the other hand, the 
generosity of the loan system means that even those who are not forced to 
borrow to the maximum level would be well advised to do so, and to put any 
spare cash that they would have used to pay their fees into an interest-bearing 
account. 
Our examples of what the reforms are likely to mean when a student leaves 
university have shown that debt repayments represent fairly small increases to 
the income tax and National Insurance that they will pay over their working 
lifetime. A maximum loan will mean an average of around 6% extra in direct 
                                                    
33 It should be noted that this does not include any of the costs of expanding the number of 
students to meet the government’s target of a 50% initial entry rate by 2010. Given the size of 
the teaching subsidies, loans and grants that will be entailed for each new student, these extra 
taxpayer costs are likely to be significant. 
34 £26,000 is just above the median income for families with at least one child aged 16. 
Source: Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) data, adjusted for inflation and English 
population weights.  
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tax over the working life for a ‘typical’ male graduate earner and around 7–8% 
for a ‘typical’ female.  
Indeed, if a young female contemplating whether or not to go to university 
realised that she might be incurring £152,000 in extra income tax and National 
Insurance payments over her working lifetime as a direct result of gaining her 
degree, we would not expect this to put her off attending higher education.35 By 
comparison with the increased income tax liability arising from the increased 
earning power her degree confers, her extra debt from student loans will be 
fairly small. 
An important concern raised by some students, and critics of the system more 
generally, is the level of debt faced by students who undertake courses that are 
longer than three years. In these cases, debt levels could be considerably 
higher, although typically the improved wage prospects of those on longer 
courses should mean that the length of time taken to repay the higher loan 
could even be shorter than for other graduates who have lower debts but who 
earn less. 
Other concerns have been voiced about whether the debt repayments will be 
extremely burdensome for those on low lifetime earnings, or for those who take 
considerable career breaks. In our example of a low-earning female with a 
career break, we have shown that the taxpayer would subsidise around 60–65% 
of the value of the loan, and that the graduate’s debt repayments are a similar 
proportion of her lifetime earnings to those of the middle earners we have 
considered. 
Of course, one of the major intentions of the reforms has been to ensure that 
more money goes into the university coffers, and to reverse the decline in 
funding per head that has been a persistent feature of the HE system over many 
years. The government projects that additional top-up fee income is likely to 
amount to around £1 billion per year. This is less than the amounts that the 
universities claim they need to fill their funding shortfalls. Taking the 
minimum level of bursaries into account, the new revenue could, however, 
mean that the level of funding per student could be increased by around 22% 
on average, though this percentage is likely to be higher for courses that charge 
the highest top-up fees.  
Perhaps the most surprising feature of all these reforms – which are largely 
being sold on the principle that graduates should bear more of the cost of their 
university education – is the amount that the new fee and support proposals 
will cost the taxpayer. 
                                                    
35 In our illustrations, the comparable figure for a male is around £154,000. 
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Appendix A 
Figure A1 
London student finances under the new system with fees of £3,000 p.a. 
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Notes: Bursaries are zero at incomes of £15,970 and over, with no tapering. We assume the 
student is in the first or second year of a three-year course. 
 
Figure A2 
Non-London student finances under the Higher Education Bill with fees of £3,000 p.a. 
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Notes: Bursaries are zero at incomes of £15,970 and over, with no tapering. We assume the 
student is in the first or second year of a three-year course. 
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Figure A3 
London student finances under the Higher Education Bill with fees of £3,000 p.a. 
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Notes: Bursaries are zero at incomes of £15,970 and over, with no tapering. We assume the 
student is in the first or second year of a three-year course. 
 
Appendix B 
Table B1 
Government costing assumptions 
 Per year 
Fee income for universities  
Current fee income (based on basic fee of £1,200) £800 million (£400 million from taxpayers) 
Additional income from variable fees (based on 75% of 
universities charging full £3,000 fee and 25% remaining at 
basic fee level); a £3,000 fee equates to a 30% increase in the 
average funding per student 
£1 billion 
Total £1.8 billion 
  
Cost of fee deferral  
Highest estimate of cost of deferring existing fees £190 million 
Highest estimate of cost of deferring variable fee £445 million 
Cost of loan write-off after 25 years £30 million 
Total £665 million 
  
Cost of student support  
Increasing loan to median basic living costs £65 million 
Cost of HE grant to £1,500 £420 million 
Total £485 million 
Note: All costings are in 2006–07 prices. 
Source: Department for Education and Skills. 
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